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Abstract 
 
Agriculture has traditionally played a significant role in the Bulgarian economy. Since 1997, the government has 
made rapid progress in implementing a wide-ranging reform program in agriculture, the financial sector and in the 
economy in general. The highest priority has been given to actions that result in a market-driven restructuring, 
rather than to financial support that would reproduce existing inefficient structures. The banking sector 
restructuring has been accompanied by the banks’ cautious approach to lending in general and particularly to 
agriculture. Some sector-specific lending programs have been introduced but they could hardly make up for modest 
bank credit to agriculture. Most of these programs are continuously undergoing changes, consistent with the 
developments in the agricultural and banking sectors. With continuing recovery of public trust in b anks, and with 
more than 70% of banks’ assets owned or controlled by foreign private banks, the sector is expected to overcome 
conservative lending.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Agriculture has traditionally played a significant role in the Bulgarian economy. Before the 
beginning of transition, Bulgaria was a major exporter of fresh and processed fruits and 
vegetables within the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The process of 
reforms and transition to market-based agriculture has been rather difficult for Bulgaria. Due to 
the disintegration of the traditional Bulgarian markets, specific procedures used to privatise state 
assets and restitute assets into private ownership, as well as due to the relative instability of the 
overall economy until 1997, there has been more disruption in the farming sector in Bulgaria than 
in many other Central and Eastern European countries. Since 1997, the government has made 
rapid progress in implementing a wide-ranging reform program with significant implications for 
agriculture and the financial sector. The highest priority has been given to actions that result in a 
market-driven sectoral restructuring, rather than to financial support that would reproduce 
existing inefficient structures. This approach has been expected to improve the sector’s 
competitiveness and performance and thus contribute to maximising the benefit to the economy 
as a whole. The banking sector restructuring has been accompanied by the banks’ conservative 
approach to lending in general and particularly to agriculture. Some sector-specific lending 
programs were introduced but they could hardly be considered substitutes for bank credit, as 
credit provided by them had not been sufficient to make up for modest bank credit to 
agriculture. Most of them are continuously undergoing changes, consistent with the 
developments in the agricultural and banking sectors.  
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1. The economic and agricultural situation in Bulgaria 
1.1. Major economic developments 
Following the 1996-97 banking sector and currency crises, the new Bulgarian Government 
implemented a radical economic reform program. Supported by the IMF, it introduced a 
currency board arrangement (CBA), which imposed prudent fiscal policies, tight prudential 
regulations, enhanced banking supervision, and radical economic restructuring. The 
implementation of the reform program resulted in improved macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Inflation and budget deficits have been put under control and the economy has experienced 
growth for a couple of years. The CBA introduction reduced inflation to about 1% in 1998. 
Some increase in inflation was recorded in 1999 (6.2%) and 2000 (11.4%) due to the strong 
US Dollar and high oil prices, but it is expected to subside to about 5% in 2001 (Table 1). 
Prudent fiscal policies have kept the budget deficit fairly low within the boundaries of 1-1.5%. In 
2001 GDP growth is expected to be 5%, driven by private consumption and investment, as well 
as by productivity gains from structural reform. 
Table 1. Bulgaria: selected economic indicators 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000* 2001** 
Real GDP -10.9 -7 3,5 2.4 5.8 5.0 
CPI, end of period 310.8 578.5 1.0 6.2 11.4 4.5 
General Government 
balance/GDP, % -10.4 -2. 5 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.5 
Current account balance/GDP, % 0.8 4.4 -0.5 -5.2 -5.8 -4.4 
Source: BNB, NSI, MF, IMF. 
*Preliminary, **Projections. 
 
Since 1997 the reform program of the government has speeded up the pace of privatisation and 
as a result of it about 80% of the assets of commercial banks together with most of the former 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) have been privatised. A deeper and more substantial restructuring 
of the newly privatised enterprises remains to be completed in order to improve the efficiency 
and competitiveness of the economy. Weak financial intermediation and high level of annual 
external debt service1 may constrain investment and economic growth. In the medium term, the 
risks include low growth owing to slow pace of reform, fiscal pressures on the expenditure side, 
and contagion from other CBA countries or emerging markets as Bulgaria moves toward reliance 
on market borrowing.  
1.2. Significance and performance of agriculture 
The significance of agriculture in Bulgaria has remained high when compared to other Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEEC). However, during the transition period the share of 
agriculture and forestry in GDP fluctuated widely: it more than doubled between 1993 and 1997 
                                                 
1. In 2001 total external debt service is expected to increase to USD 1.6 billion (10.8% of GDP) from 
USD 1.1 billion (9% of GDP) in 2000. 
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to about 24%, and then fell to about 13% in 2000 (Table 2). Agricultural employment in Bulgaria 
is high by European standards and has been growing continuously since the beginning of 
transition. In 1999 employment in agriculture reached close to 26% of total employment, 
cushioning to a certain extent the rising levels of unemployment in other sectors, particularly in 
industry. The rise in employment in agriculture together with the fluctuations in agriculture’s 
share in GDP could be explained by different factors, including restructuring of the economy, 
de-capitalisation of agriculture, rise in subsistence farming, etc.  
Table 2. Share of agriculture in GDP and in total employment, 1991-2000 
 199
1 
199
2 
199
3 
199
4 
199
5 
199
6 
199
7 
199
8 
199
9 
2000
* 
Q1-
Q3 
Share of agriculture 
in GDP, % 
 
15.2 
 
11.3 
 
10.6 
 
12.3 
 
13.4 
 
14.6 
 
23.8 
 
18.8 
 
15.1 
 
13.4 
Share of agriculture 
in total 
employment, % 
 
19.1 
 
20.7 
 
21.7 
 
22.8 
 
23.4 
 
24.2 
 
24.3 
 
24.7 
 
26 
 
26.2 
Source: NSI, 1999; European Commission, IMF. 
*Preliminary. 
 
Despite the increase in agriculture’s share in GDP and employment, observed since 1992, the 
economic transformation resulted in a decline of agricultural production both in terms of output 
and yields of main products. The yields of the main crops (cereals, vegetables, tobacco) declined 
(with the exception of tobacco) during the 1990s by some 60%. Output of the major livestock 
products (meat, dairy and eggs) declined even more than crop production. The relative 
importance of crop and livestock production has been changing continuously, but in general, the 
crop sector has preserved its dominance. 
In 1991 prices of agricultural inputs were liberalised while output price increases were restricted 
until 1997, when almost all price and trade restrictions were eliminated. The price-cost squeeze 
until 1997 was more severe and lasted longer in Bulgaria than in other CEEC. It penalised 
agricultural producers and resulted in a decline in output and a limited use of fertilisers and 
agro-chemicals.  
The fall in agricultural production has been caused by a number of supply-side factors: reduction 
in subsidies for fertilisers, decline in mechanisation, reduction in the herd, resulting from 
privatisation of animals by ill-equipped farmers, etc. In addition, declines in both domestic and 
external demand for agricultural products magnified the adverse effects of the domestically 
generated supply-side disruptions: 
- decline in per-capita consumption of meat and other major agricultural products due 
to significant decline in the purchasing power of the population; 
- decline in external demand by traditional importers of Bulgarian agricultural 
produce, as the CMEA and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) disintegrated.  
Despite these developments, together with Hungary, Bulgaria continues to be the only CEEC 
that has a positive balance of food and agricultural trade. 
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In addition to the decline in demand for agricultural products, the fall in production in the 
transition period could be attributed to general disruptions linked to the implementation of the 
land reform, as well as to insufficient investment in agriculture and food processing. Investment 
in rural infrastructure has declined sharply over the last decade. The level of support to 
agriculture, as measured by the OECD methodology indicates that since 1997 Bulgarian 
agriculture has been operating in a fairly neutral policy environment2 (OECD, 
AGR/CA/APM(2000)15). In addition, as explained by section 2., bank credit for agricultural 
producers has been insufficient. The provision of subsidised credit through different programs 
has been a part of the overall agricultural policy framework but has not been enough to make up 
for limited access to bank credit.  
1.3. Reforms in agriculture 
The transformation of agriculture in Bulgaria was based on the principles of ownership of land 
and other agricultural property. The aim of the reform program was to create a market-oriented 
and internationally competitive agricultural sector. In 1991 the Law for Agricultural Land 
Ownership and Land Use launched the restitution of land ownership rights. The Law was 
designed on the basis of historic justice, and efficiency objectives were not considered a priority. 
As a result of land reform 98% of agricultural land is privately owned and the remaining 2% is 
under legal dispute. Forest ownership restitution is underway and is close to completion.  
The first stage of restructuring and restitution of agriculture has already been completed, and the 
next stage of consolidation of farm ownership has just begun. The process of land restitution has 
resulted in highly fragmented land ownership. However, the land-use pattern is less fragmented, 
because producer co-operatives and formal and informal leasing arrangements have resulted in 
the establishment of larger farms. Within the emerging farm structure there are both large farms 
(private co-operatives and private individual farms), and a large number of small-scale farms. The 
future viability of the small-scale agricultural producers is questionable but they still play an 
important role as self-sufficient units.  
The legal framework for the functioning of a land market has been completed but an active 
agricultural land market has not developed yet. A Cadastre and Property Register Law was 
adopted by Parliament in 2000, which allows for the creation and administration of a unified 
cadastre and property register. A Cadastre Agency was created at the Ministry of Regional 
Development and Public Works. Additional efforts need to be made to create a complete unified 
cadastre as well as to make the administrative structures operational. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry (MAF) created a land market information system in end-1999. The adoption of 
legislation and creation of administrative structures are only the first steps to the creation of a 
functioning and transparent land market. However, the lease/rental market has developed quite 
successfully and is currently playing an important role in the emergence of private farms. Some of 
the main obstacles, hindering the development of the land market are: low profitability of the 
sector, high transaction costs, difficulties in finding collateral and obtaining credit, etc. The 
development of a true land market will facilitate the acceptance of land as collateral by banks.  
                                                 
2.. Support to agriculture, as measured through Total Support Estimate (TSE), was slightly negative in 1999, 
reflecting the relatively small budgetary transfers to producers and transfers to general services, as well as 
the low market support. At minus 0.1% the percentage TSE (% of GDP) was lower than the average for 
transition economies, OECD and EU (OECD, AGR/CA/APM (2000)15). 
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2. Banking sector reform and performance 
Compared to most other CEEC, the Government of Bulgaria has very limited intervention 
programs in agriculture and agricultural finance. The main way of Government intervention is 
the subsidised credit program of the State Fund Agriculture (SFA), which has commercial banks as 
its agents. Apart from SFA credit and lending under some other smaller programs (see Section 3), 
agriculture relies mainly on commercial bank credit as any other sector. The banking sector 
performance is of major importance for agricultural finance, as it determines to a great extent the 
amount of credit available to agriculture, as well as the terms under which it can be extended.  
The Bulgarian banking sector has been undergoing significant institutional reforms since the 
1996-97 banking sector crisis. The new Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) introduced 
the CBA in mid-1997, which represented a major change in the Bulgarian monetary regime. The 
CBA introduced only a limited lender of last resort (LOLR) facility and required new stricter 
prudential regulations. Foreign exchange reserves in excess of what is needed to cover the 
monetary base provide a limited LOLR facility in case of liquidity risks, affecting the stability of 
the banking system3. These funds are kept as a deposit of Banking Department with Issue 
Department, and bank refinancing is limited by the size of the deposit, which is also subject to 
negotiations with the IMF. One of the performance criteria of the IMF-supported program 
under the current Extended Fund Facility requires consultations with the IMF when a loan above 
BGN4 2 million is to be extended to a bank. 
The CBA introduction speeded up bank privatisation. The majority of state-owned banks has 
already been privatised by foreign investors. At present more than 80% of banks’ assets are 
privately owned and more than 70% of banks’ assets are held or controlled by foreign banks. As 
of October 2000, publicly owned banks (State Savings Bank, Biochim, Promotional Bank and 
Municipal Bank) held 18.8% of the total banking sector assets. By end-2001, the Government 
intends to sell Biochim and State Savings Bank. 
The CBA introduction together with the new Law on Banks (1997) required the introduction of 
new much tighter prudential regulations. For example, risk weighted capital adequacy 
requirements were raised initially to 10% and subsequently to 12%. The minimum required 
reserves were kept at a relatively high level. Initially, BNB Regulation 21 fixed them at 11% of 
deposits, while in mid-2000 they were reduced to 8%. The conditions for access to the minimum 
required reserves were eased by the new version of Regulation 21 in early April 1998, which 
introduced daily averaging, and allowed banks access to 100% of required reserves on any given 
day. Tightening of prudential regulations included new requirements on large loan exposures, 
aggregate exposure to a single party, open foreign exchange position, etc. In addition, the 
government introduced stricter policies for providing government guarantees for loans. 
                                                 
3. Regulation 6 of the BNB establishes the terms of extending co llateralised Lev loans to banks in cases of 
liquidity risks affecting the stability of the banking system. The total amount of the highly liquid assets 
pledged as a collateral should cover at least 125% of the loan amount approved by the BNB. The loan 
should be repaid within three months. 
4. BGN = BGL 1 000 since mid-1999. 
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Table 3. Quality of loan portfolio of commercial banks 
 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 
Loans (million, BGN) 3 806 5 945.9 5 042 7 395 
Standard, % 78.8 86.6 86.2 91.8 
Watch, % 3.7 3.6 4.4 2.8 
Substandard, % 2.7 1.9 1.4 1.2 
Doubtful, % 2.0 0.6 0.9 0.8 
Loss, % 12.9 7.3 13.1 3.4 
Provisions, %   10.0 6.5 
Source: BNB. 
 
Both on-site and off-site banking supervision have been enhanced since 1997, which has 
contributed to improved compliance with prudential regulations. Since the adoption of the new 
banking law and related prudential regulations, the incidence of violations of major requirements, 
such as capital adequacy, open foreign exchange position and loan concentration to individual 
borrowers, has been reduced significantly. Total risk-weighted capital adequacy increased from 
10.2% in June 1997 to 35.6% in December 2000. The quality of banks’ loan portfolios kept 
improving, with standard loans representing close to 92% of all loans at the end of 2000 
(Table 3.). For comparison, non-performing loans represented more than 70% of loans in the 
pre-crisis 1995. Tighter prudential regulations and enhanced banking supervision required from 
banks more conservative lending policies, which placed challenges to intermediation but resulted 
in a generally sounder banking sector. 
Table 4. Domestic credit 
 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 
Domestic credit/GDP, %, 
including: 67.4 61.5 28.8 20.7 19.0 18.2 
          Claims on general govt., 
% 30.6 47.0 11.4 4.3 2.0 2.1 
          Claims on non-financial  
          public sector, % 19.2 30.1 6.5 4.8 3.5 1.6 
          Claims on private sector, 
%  21.6 37.0 11.0 11.6 13.5 14.7 
Source: BNB. 
 
Although the banking sector is sound, the monetary aggregates and deposit-to-GDP indicators 
suggest that the public’s trust in banks is growing but has not been fully restored to its pre-crisis 
level yet. Once the CBA was introduced, initial re-monetisation began to speed up without being 
able to reach the pre-crisis levels except for the Lev currency. At the end of 2000, monetisation, 
measured by broad money (M3) as a percentage of GDP, marked some progress, but at 36% in 
end-2000 it is still below the end-1995 level. Deposits-to-GDP ratio remains stable at about 21% 
throughout the post-crisis period but is also below the pre-crisis level, as the revival of 
confidence in banks since the CBA introduction has not been strong enough to restore deposits 
to their pre-crisis level. The banking sector crisis affected depositors’ preference and shortened 
the maturity structure of deposits, making demand deposits the preferred ones, which puts 
certain limitations on banks’ long-term lending. 
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Banks prefer to invest in low-risk government securities and deposits with foreign banks. At the 
end of 2000 banks’ loans represent only 31% of banks’ assets, while more than 50% of banks’ 
assets are invested in securities and deposits with banks, mainly foreign. Domestic credit-to-GDP 
ratio and all its components marked a substantial contraction from 67% in end-1995 to 18% in 
end-2000 (Table 4). Since the second half of 1997 credit to the central government has begun to 
decline due to improved fiscal discipline and lower interest payments on domestic debt. Credit to 
the private sector has been growing both in absolute terms, and as a share of domestic credit 
(close to 80%) but as a percentage of GDP is still low at 14.7% in end-2000. The modest deposit 
base and credit to the private sector limit the potential contribution of banks to economic 
development in general and to agriculture in particular. 
The relatively slow growth of credit to the private sector as compared to the private sector 
growth is usually explained by banks’ risk aversion related to the slow recovery of public trust in 
the post-crisis period, the CBA limited LOLR facility, and new tighter prudential regulations. In 
addition, there are some other important factors behind banks’ behaviour (Ulgenerk, Esen and L. 
Zlaoui, 2000): 
- Economic restructuring of both the real and financial sectors makes banks 
increasingly risk averse. Banks that have been undergoing privatisation have become 
conservative in order to avoid portfolio deterioration right before their privatisation. 
At the same time some of their traditional customers have ceased to exist or reduced 
operations, while new customers from the emerging private sector do not have a 
credit history or appropriate collateral. Intensification of industrial restructuring, 
accompanied by substantial firm exit and new entry has created uncertain customer 
base that makes banks increasingly conservative in lending. 
- Insufficient competition in the banking sector also impedes lending. Interest spreads 
are high and banks have not felt pressure to cut costs and diversify their products 
yet.  
- The imperfect legal environment and uncertain protection of creditors’ rights also 
contribute to banks reluctance to increase lending. The resolution of financial 
disputes is often slow, and contract enforcement weak, collateral is hard to seize, 
and bankruptcy and liquidation procedures remain clumsy and uncertain. 
Banks’ cautious attitude to lending affected seriously agriculture. In the end of 2000 bank credit 
to agriculture, including SFA credit amounted to less than 1% of GDP. In addition to all factors 
determining banks’ lending policies, there are some sector-specific factors, such as absence of 
collateral, low profitability and higher uncertainty, contributing to even more limited lending to 
agriculture (See ATTACHMENTS 1 and 2). Banks demand higher collateral for loans to farmers 
both due to stringent prudential regulations, and because they view agriculture as a risky sector, in 
which they do not have enough expertise and can hardly assess risk. On the other hand, farmers 
continue to be reluctant to mortgage their homes, which are the only collateral banks consider 
acceptable. Land cannot be accepted as a collateral, because a true land market has not been 
developed yet.  
Some specific measures, such as use of warehouse receipts as collateral for bank loans for 
working capital, have already been introduced but remain insufficient to increase lending to 
agriculture5. Additional policy measures are expected to be implemented soon and to boost credit 
                                                 
5. The use of warehouse receipts is still limited due to the underdeveloped trade with grain on the 
Commodity Exchange. Other obstacles include the limited capacity of licensed warehouses, insufficient 
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to agriculture. Among them are improvements of the legislative framework for equipment and 
machinery leasing, as well as creation of functioning registers to which potential lenders can refer 
to check whether the collateral has already been used on another loan. In order to strengthen 
creditors’ rights, improvement of collection of collateral, and a new bank bankruptcy law to deal 
with closed banks, are underway.  
With continuing recovery of public trust in banks, and with more than 70% of banks’ assets 
owned or controlled by foreign private banks, competition in the sector is growing and banks are 
gradually overcoming their conservative lending policies. In order to make up for insufficient 
lending to agriculture by commercial banks, several specific lending schemes were introduced in 
the mid-90s. However, they cannot be considered substitutes for bank credit. 
3. Programs supporting lending to agriculture 
Apart from commercial bank credit, agriculture currently relies on specific lending programs, based on 
the SFA and Tobacco Fund. Other institutions, providing lending to agriculture are the Private Mutual 
Rural Credit Associations. There are internationally supported programs such as SAPARD, as well as 
bilateral programs that provide either loans or grants, to agriculture. All these lending programs are 
continuously undergoing changes, reflecting the developments in agriculture and banks. 
 
3.1. Tobacco Fund and State Fund Agriculture 
There are two major funds, set up to provide credit to agriculture within specific programs. 
These are the Tobacco Fund and the SFA. Fund Tobacco lends funds to tobacco processors only for 
the tobacco, which has been produced under a contract, but has not been purchased6, while SFA 
provides loans to support regular farming activities. The SFA was established in 1995 on the 
basis of the Law on Support of Agricultural Producers and began operating in early 1996. The 
SFA is a legal entity, which has its own budget, subject to annual approval by the Council of 
Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria upon a proposal of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry. The SFA main activity has been to provide funds directly to farmers, using commercial 
banks as agents. The different types of schemes financed by the SFA vary from year to year, and 
include a seasonal credit facility7, short-term credit8, long-term investment credit9 and subsidies10.  
The SFA extends its short-term loans under specific regulations and requirements. The 
transaction costs involved in the administration of the SFA scheme are somewhat distortive as 
                                                                                                                                                        
capitalization of the fund that guarantees the loans extended against warehouse receipts, and insufficient 
protection of creditors’ rights.  
6. In July 2000 the Council of Ministers issued Ordinance No. 511, according to which, Fund Tobacco could 
lend to tobacco processors for unsold quantities of contracted tobacco, produced in 1999, which had not 
been purchased by April 2000. Under a decision of the Board of Directors, Fund Tobacco extended 
BGN 1.311 million loans to tobacco processors for purchasing 634 tonnes of tobacco, from tobacco 
harvest 1999. 
7. Usually finances inputs for wheat, maize and sunflower production with a 50% interest subsidy. 
8. In 2000 the SFA earmarked short-term credit of about BGN 34.5 million, out of which close to 
BGN 30.0 million (close to 87%) was disbursed.  
9. In the first half of 2000 about BGN 40.0 million was allocated for investment projects but only part of it 
has been disbursed. 
10. The SFA has disbursed subsidies of about BGN 10.3 million. 
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they favour certain groups of farmers and certain crops over others. Specific regulations provide 
incentives to farmers to change their production activities in a way that is not in line with 
improving the sector’s overall net income contribution. The SFA short-term credit lines compete 
to a certain extent with potential credit lines of commercial banks. Banks might generally be more 
interested in short-term lending, as it is relatively less risky than long-term credit in unknown 
markets and for unknown clients. Though competition with the SFA subsidised credits could 
hardly be considered the major cause for banks’ conservative lending policies, it might well 
contribute to them. Recognising these problems, the Government intends to gradually phase out 
SFA short-term credit lines. 
In addition to the short-term credits, the SFA has also a number of longer-term investment credit 
lines that provide access to long-term credit to farmers, which is difficult to obtain from banks, 
since banks are constraint by their short-term deposit base and make very few long-term loans. 
However, even the SFA investment credit lines are hardly made use of, because banks are 
reluctant to make what they consider relatively small high–risk loans for low interest rates on 
them. To overcome banks’ unwillingness to make use of the SFA’s investment credit lines, the 
SFA might wish to shift emphasis from direct long-term credit to providing partial risk 
guarantees for these credit lines. This approach creates incentives for banks to carry out a more 
careful risk assessment for each loan, as they will bear most of the risk of default. Banks, not the 
SFA should be given the opportunity to determine the procedures and risk assessment of 
investment projects, supported by the SFA.  
Some important steps have been undertaken to reform the SFA’s investment program, including 
requirements for annual repayments of at least principal, rather than lengthy grace periods, so 
that the adverse effect on the credit market is minimised. Nevertheless, the Government is to 
develop a strategy to promote alternative private bank facilities, such as equipment leasing, 
mortgage loans, etc.  
The SFA investment program is undergoing reform. Currently the MAF has decided to make the 
SFA an agent for SAPARD in order to make use of its institutional capacity to provide technical 
assistance in project assessment. According to the agreement achieved with the European 
Commission (EC) the functions of a SAPARD Agency for Bulgaria will be performed by a 
functional structure set up within the State Fund Agriculture. Applicants for grants under 
SAPARD are expected to apply at the SFA Regional Directorates, which are supposed to review 
and assess applicants’ documentation as well as to make on-site inspections of applicants. The 
SFA Regional Directorates have to approve or reject applicants for SAPARD co-financing within 
a period of three months.  
The State Fund Agriculture launched the accreditation program in July 1999. The process of 
establishing the administrative structure of the Agency, staff recruitment, elaboration of manuals 
and other necessary documentation defining the rules of procedure of the operational, paying and 
auditing unit of the Agency, has already been completed. 
3.2. SAPARD 
The European Union (EU) created SAPARD with the objective to support and prepare applicant 
countries in the field of agriculture during the period 2000-2006 through providing annual 
subsidies of about Euro 53 million to co-finance different projects. The adoption of a National 
Agriculture and Rural Development Plan (NARDP) is a precondition for launching the EC 
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program for agriculture and rural development. The NARDP11 was prepared by the MAF in 
compliance with the main objectives of the National Economic Development Plan and covers 
the period 2000-2006. The NARDP was drafted in close collaboration with representatives of 
regional and local authorities, farmers’ associations, regional development agencies and other 
non-governmental organisations. The two main objectives of NARDP are: 
- “development of an efficient, sustainable and competitive agriculture and 
food-processing, through improved market and technological infrastructure, as well 
as strategic investment policies aimed at reaching EU standards; 
- achievement of sustainable rural development, consistent with the best 
environmental practices through creating alternative employment and appropriate 
infrastructure, diversification of economic activities, leading to improved living 
conditions, higher income and better employment opportunities for the rural 
population.” 
For the purpose of achieving these two objectives four priority areas for Bulgarian agriculture 
were defined: 
(1) improvement of the conditions for production, processing and marketing of 
agriculture, forestry and fishery products in accordance with EU standards; 
development of environmentally friendly agriculture, as well as improvement of the 
activities for environmental protection in agriculture and forestry; 
(2) integrated development of rural regions aiming at preservation and consolidation of 
their economies and communities in order to cut down the depopulation process in 
these regions; 
(3) investment in human resources – qualification and training of employed in the 
production and processing of agriculture, forestry and fishery products; 
(4) technical assistance.  
The above 4 priority areas determine more than 10 measures, which are in the focus of the 
investment projects, financed by the EU under SAPARD. Priority area (1), for example, includes 
6 measures - 1.1 to 1.6. Measure 1.1 – Investments in agriculture farms, is for supporting private 
investments for the improvement of technologies and quality of production in the major 
agriculture sectors.12 Measure 1.1.includes 4 sub-measures (supports 4 sectors), which are shown 
in Table 5 below. 
                                                 
11. The NARDP was adopted by the Council of Ministers by a Decision No. 726 dated 22 Nov. 1999 and 
presented to the EC. In October 2000, NARDP 2000-2006 was approved  by the European Commission.  
12. Measure 1.1 is quite representative for the conditions of supporting investment projects of farmers under 
SAPARD and for the purpose of this report we will present in more detail the characteristics of SAPARD 
support for this measure only.  
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Table 5. SAPARD, Measure 1.1: investments in agriculture farms in Bulgaria - 
 Budget allocation by sectors 
Sector Allocated, % 
Milk and milk processing 23.28 
Meat and meat processing 8.96 
Fruit-growing and vine-growing 51.60 
Vegetable-growing, ethereal plants, herbs, corn/wheat growing, oil plants, 
cotton, tobacco (high-quality brands) 
 
16.16 
Total 100.00 
 
SAPARD financing under measure 1.1.can be summarised as follows: 
Potential beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries may be private agricultural producers – natural/physical persons or legal entities, 
both have to be registered as agriculture producers. The legal entities with more than 25% of 
state-owned shares are not eligible. 
Financing conditions 
Financing is in the form of subsidies. The total amount of the subsidy (national funds + EU 
funds) is 50% of the approved investment costs. The amount of the subsidy is calculated by 
deducting aids/funds received from other public donors. The financial contribution of the 
beneficiary shall be 50% of the approved investment costs.  
The maximum amount of the funds to cover 50% of the approved costs of investment projects is 
Euro 500 000 per farm for the period of program implementation (2000 – 2006). The minimum 
amount of the funds to cover 50% of the approved costs of investment projects for the period of 
program implementation is: 
- Euro 15 000 for the first two sectors in Table 5 – milk and meat; 
- Euro 10 000 for the third and fourth sectors in Table 5 – orchards, vineyards, 
vegetables, tobacco, etc.  
Investment costs may include project preparation costs up to 5% of total investment costs, and 
up to 12% in the cases of development of detailed design for construction. 
General eligibility criteria (applicable for all 4 sectors) 
- young farmers – age between 18 and 40 years13; 
- full employment; 
- at least 50% of total income of the beneficiary comes from the farm; 
                                                 
13. Currently less than 15% of the farmers in Bulgaria are under 40 years of age. 
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- at least three years of experience in agriculture or a diploma for acquired 
qualification in the field of agriculture, issued by a reputable/acknowledged school; 
- less than 50 employees in the farm14; 
- the investment project is for protection of the environment; 
- the investment project is for improvement of the hygienic conditions of production. 
SAPARD is expected to begin financing the following projects, included in three of the four 
priority areas: investments in agricultural farms, processing and marketing improvement of 
agricultural and fish products, development and diversification of economic activities, setting up 
producer groups, and provision of technical assistance. 
The SAPARD Agency was accredited in December 2000 by the Bulgarian Government and in 
May 2001 by the European Commission. The SAPARD Agency is responsible for project 
selection, tendering and contracting, execution of on-site inspections both prior to and after 
project approval, monitoring of progress of measures against indicators, reporting on progress 
against indicators, authorization of payment, execution of payment, setting up a reliable 
programme implementation database, etc.    
3.3. Agricultural Capital Fund Scheme (ACFS) 
Small farmers will continue to constitute a substantial part of the rural sector for some time, 
though their number is expected to dwindle as land consolidation proceeds. However, their 
access to commercial bank credit remains quite limited and they definitely need some assistance 
in obtaining loans. The Private Mutual Rural Credit Associations (PMRCAs) represent another 
program that provides easier access to credit for small-scale farmers.  
The PRMCAs’ operation is made possible by paragraph 17 of the Transitional and Final 
Provisions to the Law on Banks, which authorises them to undertake lending activities, without 
being licensed as banks. The General Implementation Rules of the ACFS and the standard 
Organisation Statute appended to the Memorandum of Understanding determine the scope of 
the PRMCAs’ operations. The PRMCAs may benefit from some improvements in the legislative 
framework, treating their operation.  
The PMRCAs operate under the ACFS, which is financed by PHARE and the Government of 
Bulgaria. Under the Memorandum of Understanding, between the Government of 
Bulgaria (GOB) and the European Commission (EC), both parties agreed to co-fund the project. 
The EC granted ECU 7 million and the GOB provided the Leva equivalent of ECU 3 million. 
These funds were used to increase PMRCA capital and to extend loans. In 1998, the GOB 
provided to ACFS another BGN 4 million equivalent through the SFA. In February 2000, the 
Federation of the PMRCAs entered into a partnership with the German Co-operative and 
Raiffeisen Union. It committed itself to providing technical and consulting assistance to 
PMRCAs under the project Bulgarian Co-operative System Facilitation financed by the German 
government. 
As of end-1999, PRMCAs extended 5 500 loans of total value of BGN 15 million. The 
repayment rate was estimated at 93%. One-year loans of value BGN 3 000 represent the 
                                                 
14. Prevailing is the number of small and medium private farms in Bulgaria. Only 0.2% of them have more 
than 10 ha of land. The average amount of arable land for private farms is between 1.5 ha and 2 ha. 
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prevailing number of loans extended under the PRMCAs. However, there have been a number of 
investment loans of value up to BGN 30 000 maturing in 3 years. 
3.4. Experience of the Swiss Co-operation with Bulgaria in the field of agriculture 
development 
The Swiss Co-operation Program with Bulgaria has grown substantially within the last four years, 
and has developed two specific projects, providing finance for agriculture. The Swiss Agency 
for Co-operation and Development (SDC) is in charge of the Technical Assistance including 
about 20 projects/programs in various sectors. Two of the projects/activities of the Swiss 
Co-operation Program, related to the sector of agriculture, are (i) Development of Sustainable 
Agriculture in the Region of Central Balkan Range and (ii) Credit Commission.  
(i) Development of Sustainable Agriculture in the Region of the Central Balkan Range 
The project is managed by the Swiss Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture in 
Bulgaria (Foundation), which was set up in 1998 by the Research Institute for Biological 
Cultivation (FiBL), Frick, Switzerland. The project promotes an effective use of resources that 
can help farmers meet the demands of the market in the best possible way. The aim is to 
promote farming efficiency by acquiring more information and applying the methods of 
sustainable bio-agriculture. The target group are independent, capable and market oriented 
farmers from eight municipalities in the Central Balkan area. The project foresees the following 
measures: (1) development of a concept for an environmentally friendly use of resources; 
(2) dissemination of ecological production methods (use of fertilisers, cultivation of pasture, 
harvest rotation, etc.) through information, specialised publications, training, demonstrations in 
the farms, consulting by Swiss and Bulgarian experts; (3) extension of investment loans that will 
increase production capacities and (4) support for the regional marketing of farm produce 
through market research and marketing strategies. One of the consultants’ main activities is to 
assist farmers in drafting business plans for applying for loans. 
(ii) Credit Commission 
At the end of 1999 the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB) and the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Co-operation (SDC) signed an agreement for opening a credit line to support private farmers 
and independent small and medium enterprises (SME) from the mountain regions of the Central 
Balkan Range – the Region of activity of SDC’s projects for promoting sustainable 
agriculture (FiBL) and assisting SME’s (FAEL). A Credit Commission responsible for the lending 
procedures has been set up within the framework of the Co-ordination Office of the SDC in 
Sofia, which makes the final decisions on extending loans.  
Credit line for private farmers (investment credits) 
The size of the credit line is 500 000 CHF for the first three years of the projects. The maximum 
loan is up to the Leva equivalent of 15 000 CHF. Financing is provided for up to 70% of the 
total project cost. The term of repayment is up to 3 years with a possibility for a grace period of 6 
months and an interest rate of about 10-11% (the base interest rate + 7). Entitled to credits are 
only producers from the target region that are market oriented and applying the method of 
organic (bio-) farming.  
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The loans are extended to the farmers by UBB. Farmers-loan recipients usually use buildings, 
equipment, livestock, etc. as collateral. The amount of collateral, required by the credit 
commission varies depending on the type of assets and their liquidity but rarely the estimated 
market price of assets used as collateral exceeds 110-120% of the loan amount. This is quite 
preferential for the farmers, provided that the collateral for investment loans, required by 
commercial banks is normally much higher.  
Some major specific requirements (eligibility criteria) for providing loans from the Swiss credit 
line include: (1) The farmer applies the methods of biological agriculture, (2) Age – under 
50 years, (3) The farmer is registered as an agriculture producer (4) Agriculture accounting is 
introduced and strictly applied after the loan is extended, (6) Co-operation with the Swiss 
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture in Bulgaria, (7) The farmer has the necessary land on the 
territory of the investment project, either owned or rented, (8) At least 50% of the production is 
for the market, (9) At least two years experience in agriculture/farm management. 
The SDC credit line for farmers is a small-scale one, and it has not been set up solely for the 
purpose of providing loans to farmers. The project aims at improving the capacity of farmers to 
apply for bank loans, and bank staff to review and appraise loan applications from the agriculture 
sector. One of the major objectives is to test mechanisms for encouraging and promoting the 
involvement of commercial banks in providing loans to private farmers on a much broader scale.  
The loan applications are reviewed, analysed and appraised independently by both the 
Foundation and the staff of the respective regional branches of UBB. Most of the work on 
drafting loan applications, including business plans, is done by the responsible Foundation team, 
who acts as the main consultant to the farmers in this process. After that loan applications are 
submitted to the Credit Commission, which makes the final decisions on financing. The Credit 
Commission includes representatives of SDC, the Foundation and UBB, as well as independent 
experts.  
One major reason for banks to refrain from providing loans to farmers is that their lending 
departments are not familiar in detail with the specifics of agriculture business. The joint work of 
the Foundation, the Credit Commission and UBB has indicated that at this stage, loan officers of 
Bulgarian banks are not enough prepared for appraising farmers’ loan applications. In this respect 
the program of the Credit Commission envisages training of banks’ loan officers in Switzerland 
in developing and adapting methodology/guidelines for review, analysis and appraisal of farmers’ 
credit files. 
4. Conclusions 
The first stage of restructuring and restitution of agriculture has already been completed, and the 
next stage of consolidation of farm ownership has just begun. Although the legal framework for 
the functioning of a land market has been completed, an active agricultural land market does not 
exist yet. Economic transformation resulted in a decline of agricultural production both in terms 
of output and yields of main products. The decline in production could be attributed to general 
disruptions linked to the implementation of the land reform, insufficient investment in 
agriculture, and decline in external demand by traditional importers of Bulgarian agricultural 
produce. Availability of investment capital continues to be a constraint on the ability of 
agricultural and agro-industrial producers to restructure, improve their competitiveness and grow. 
Bulgaria has limited intervention programs in agriculture and agricultural finance. The level of 
support to agriculture, as measured by the OECD methodology indicates that since 1997 
Bulgarian agriculture has been operating in a fairly neutral policy environment. In addition, bank 
credit for agricultural producers has been insufficient.  
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Agriculture relies mainly on commercial bank credit as any other sector, which makes the banking 
sector performance of major importance for agricultural finance. The Bulgarian banking sector 
has been undergoing a significant institutional reform since the CBA introduction in mid-1997, 
which represented a major change in the monetary regime, and imposed new conditions of 
operation on the banking sector. It provides only a limited LOLR facility and together with the 
new Law on Banks required the introduction of new much tighter prudential regulations. Banks’ 
cautious approach to lending has placed challenges for intermediation but has resulted in a 
generally sounder banking sector.  
In addition to all factors determining banks’ conservative lending policies, there are some 
sector-specific factors, such as absence of collateral, low profitability and higher uncertainty, 
contributing to even more limited lending to agriculture. Banks demand higher collateral for 
loans to farmers both because of the stringent prudential regulations, and because they view 
agriculture as a risky sector, in which they do not have enough expertise and can hardly assess 
risk. On the other hand, farmers continue to be reluctant to mortgage their homes, which are the 
only appropriate collateral banks consider acceptable. Land cannot be accepted as a collateral, 
because a true land market has not been developed yet.  
Some sector-specific measures, such as use of warehouse receipts as collateral for bank loans for 
working capital, have already been introduced. Additional policy measures will be implemented to 
boost credit to agriculture. Among them are improvements of the legislative framework for 
equipment and machinery leasing, as well as improvement of the functioning registers to which 
potential lenders can refer to check whether the collateral has already been used on another loan. 
In order to strengthen creditors’ rights, improvement of collection of collateral, and a new bank 
bankruptcy law to deal with closed banks, are underway. With continuing recovery of public’s 
trust in banks, and with more than 70% of banks’ assets owned or controlled by foreign private 
banks, competition in the sector is growing and stimulating banks to overcome their conservative 
lending policies.  
Apart from commercial bank credit, agriculture currently relies on specific lending programs, 
based on the SFA and Tobacco Fund. Other institutions, providing lending to agriculture are the 
Private Mutual Rural Credit Associations. There are internationally supported programs such as 
SAPARD, as well as bilateral programs that provide or will soon begin providing either loans or 
grants, to agriculture. The existing programs that support lending to agriculture cannot be 
considered substitutes for bank credit, as credit provided by them cannot make up for bank 
lending. Most of these programs rely on commercial banks as their intermediaries. However, they 
have failed to address seriously the issues of lack of sufficient incentives for banks to provide 
finance to agriculture. This has been one of the main deficiencies of the SFA operation, which 
should not be repeated under new programs, including SAPARD.  
The programs supporting lending to agriculture are continuously undergoing changes. For 
example, the SFA investment program has undergone reform. The MAF decided to make the 
SFA an Agency for SAPARD in order to make use of its institutional capacity to provide 
technical assistance in project assessment. The SAPARD Agency was accredited in December 
2000 by the Bulgarian Government and in May 2001 by the European Commission. SAPARD is 
going to play a major role in preparing Bulgarian agriculture for EU accession. The EU created 
SAPARD with the objective to support and prepare applicant countries in the field of agriculture 
during the period 2000-2006. The adoption of a National Agriculture and Rural Development 
Plan, which Bulgaria has already done, is a precondition for launching the EC program for 
agriculture and rural development. 
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ATTACHMENT 1
M A J O R  R E A S O N S  W H Y  B A N K S  I N
B U L G A R I A  D O  N O T  L E N D  T O  A G R I C U L T U R E
T H E  L A W  O N  B A N K S
I M P O S E S  T I G H T E R
P R U D E N T I A L
R E G U L A T I O N S
B A N K S  P R E F E R  T O
I N V E S T  I N  R I S K - F R E E
A S S E T S
INSUFFICIENT USE OF
INFORMATION ON EXTENDED
CREDIT AND PLEDGES
O N L Y  H I G H L Y  L I Q U I D  A S S E T S
A R E  A C C E P T E D  A S
C O L L A T E R A L
D I F F I C U L T I E S  I N  A S S E S S I N G
F A R M E R S ’  S O L V E N C Y
U N C E R T A I N  P R O T E C T I O N
O F  C R E D I T O R S ’  R I G H T S
D U E  T O  C L U M S Y
 L E G A L  P R O C E D U R E S
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ATTACHMENT 2
R E A S O N S  W H Y
F A R M E R S  H A V E  L I M I T E D  A C C E S S  T O
C O M M E R C I A L  F I N A N C E
T h e  m a r k e t
of  land  i s
n o t
d e v e l o p e d
The legal
framework
F a r m e r s  h a v e
insuf f ic ien t
in fo rmat ion
a b o u t
f inanc ing
oppor tuni t ies
The
banking
system
Instability of
the market of
agricultural
products
Reasons
within the
farmers
Post-
restitution
issues
Unclear
legal
procedures
Inefficient
administra-
tion
Decline in the
yield of main
agriculture
products
Land is not
accepted as
collateral
Conserva t i sm
of  Bu lga r i ans
wi th  regard  to
sales  of  land
Insufficient
motivation for
investment
projects
Lack of
accoun t ing
in  the  smal l
p r i v a t e  f a r m s
Legal
constraints
Uncer ta in
pro tec t ion  o f
credi tors’
r ights  due to
c lumsy  l ega l
p rocedures
Insufficient
use of
information
on extended
credit and
pledges
Lack of  in teres t
b y  b a n k s
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